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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 183 
Accident time: 12:45 Accident Date: 22/08/1995 
Where it occurred: Ou Srolao Village, 
Battambang Province 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Detection accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: metal fragments 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
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Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in three-man teams with a two-man 
drill. In this  one deminer used the detector and marked any signals while another looked for 
tripwires, cut undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third deminer was resting. 
The three rotated at fixed intervals. 
A country MAC accident report was located in January 1999 and translated from the original 
Khmer and French. The following summarises its content. 
The mined area was 50m from the village and measured 34,926m2. Clearance started on 11th 
May 1995 and on 21st August 1995 part of the section was redeployed, leaving ten deminers 
to complete the work by 8th September 1995. Of the mines found, about 98% were PMN-2s.  
The victim was working as the detector man and he and his partners had found and 
destroyed three mines that day. The work was slowed by the large number of fragments in 
their lane. The prodder-man was investigating the source of a detector reading with a 
prodder, and called the victim to mark the reading again. The victim had difficulty centring the 
signal and in an attempt to bring the detector head closer to the surface of the ground he 
used the head to brush away soil and small stones.  
At 12:45 he initiated a mine with his detector, causing him to stagger backwards and collapse 
about 4 metres behind. After first aid the victim left by ambulance, arriving at Battambang 
Provincial Hospital at 13:30. The victim was not wearing his safety spectacles, which were 
found in his hand (he claimed that he was about to put them on). The detector was 
"completely destroyed". 
The victim subsequently admitted that he had been using the detector to brush away soil. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators stated that the detector head should have been 5cm above the surface of 
the ground. Where there were stones and excess soil, they said it should be carefully 
removed by hand. The victim was found to have breached SOPs in his use of the detector 
and in failing to wear his safety spectacles. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the Site Manager and Supervisor should be held 
responsible for the mistakes of their subordinates and should each receive a written warning. 
The victim was aware of SOPs regarding the use of his detector and safety spectacles and 
breached them, so they recommended that his compensation should be reduced by 20%.  
[See the accident in Cambodia that occurred on 2nd February 1996, when the investigator’s 
advice was to use the detector very close to the ground.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 233 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: US$3,175 Time to hospital: 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: none 
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Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Body 
minor Face 
minor Genitals 
severe Eye 
severe Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Arm Above elbow 
Eye  
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A medical report listed the victim's injuries as: 
• a large and deep wound to the left upper arm, 
• large serious injuries on the left and right thighs complicated by destruction of the 
muscle, 
• a serious injury to the right eye and small fragment wounds to the face 
• a  superficial fragment wound to the genitals 
• multiple fragment wounds to the left side of the thorax and left arm. 
The victim was operated on immediately on arrival in hospital, with further operations on 8th 
and 22nd  September 1995. During these operations, his arm was amputated [presumably 
above the elbow]. On 27th November 1995 it was confirmed that the sight in his right eye 
could not be saved. 
It is not clear from the file whether a recommendation to reduce the payout by 20% as a 
punishment for breaching SOPs was ever carried out. The victim was awarded $3,175 [how 
this figure was arrived at is not recorded but there appears to have been a reduction]. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" as recognised by 
the investigators who recommended written warnings for field supervisors who allowed the 
victim to work in an unsafe manner.  
There is some evidence of a management failing because the detector was known to be 
inadequate but had not been replaced. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate 
equipment”. 
The question of punishing the victim by reducing compensation deserves comment. The 
victim had paid out of his own salary into a compensation fund and was injured while working. 
The responsibility for field discipline rested with the field supervisors, who were criticised by 
the investigators. Punishment of victims occurs in other accidents involving this demining 
group.    
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Contradictory advice from investigators [see Cambodian accident on 2nd February 1996] 
regarding how close to the ground to use the detector implies that those responsible for SOPs 
and training were “confused”. 
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